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Volatility, Diversification and Development in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries 
MIKLOS KOREN AND SILVANA TENREYRO
∗ 
Abstract 
This paper studies the evolution of volatility and its sources in the six Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries from 1970 to the present. We break down volatility into three 
main components. The first component relates to the volatility caused by sector-specific 
shocks (e.g. shocks to the oil sector). The second component relates to aggregate 
country-specific shocks that affect all sectors in the economy (e.g. shocks due to policy 
or political instability). The third component relates to the covariance between country-
specific and sector-specific shocks (e.g. the degree of pro- or counter-cyclicality of 
macroeconomic policy vis-à-vis sectoral shocks). We find that volatility has 
significantly declined in the past four decades, in part due to a higher degree of sectoral 
diversification in most GCC economies. There is, however, considerable scope for 
progress, which could stem, for example, from more countercyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies. Moreover, the global financial crisis has revealed financial-sector 
vulnerabilities in some GCC countries that need to be addressed in order to limit future 
economic disruptions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Confronting the economic and security challenges posed by an unstable regional 
environment, the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates agreed in 1981 to form the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf, also known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Initially a common trade bloc, 
the GCC launched a common market on 1 January 2008 and plans to establish a common 
currency, the Khaleeji. 
The economic history of these six countries has been strongly shaped by the discovery 
of oilfields, which started in Bahrain in the early 1930s, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the late 
1930s, and Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates in the 1940s and 1950s. While 
initially the oilfields were exploited by British companies, by the early 1970s all six countries 
had gained independence and were in full control of the fields and means of production, as 
well as being active members (except for Bahrain and Oman) of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Oil had by then become the dominant sector in these 
economies. 
                                                 
∗ The authors would like to thank Francesco Caselli for useful discussions and two anonymous referees for 
thoughtful comments. 
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The steep rises in oil prices caused by the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1979 
Iranian revolution, and the dramatic six-year-long decline in prices caused by the oil glut that 
followed, led to increased concern over the insurmountable volatility brought about by the 
economies’ heavy reliance on oil. These developments were to a large extent the motivation 
for one of the central objectives of the 1981 Unified Economic Agreement between the 
Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which seeks to ‘coordinate industrial activities 
and formulate policies and mechanisms which will lead to industrial development and the 
diversification of their products on an integrated basis’ (Article 12). 
In this paper we seek to study whether and to what extent the objectives of industrial 
development and diversification envisioned in the formation of the GCC have materialised.1 
Concretely, we study the patterns of economic diversification and volatility in all six 
countries, breaking down volatility into three main components. 
The first component relates to the volatility of sectoral shocks. In general, the more 
diversified a country and the less the intrinsic variability of each sector, the lower is the level 
of volatility. Sectoral shocks can be global (affecting all countries in the world in the same 
direction) or country-specific (having different effects in different countries, as, we shall 
argue, is the case with oil shocks).  
The second component relates to aggregate country-specific shocks. This component 
captures aggregate shocks that affect all sectors in the economy, reflecting, for example, 
policy, institutional or political changes, as well as technological shocks that are common  
to all sectors. 
The third component relates to the covariance between country-specific and sector-
specific shocks; in particular, changes in fiscal or monetary policy instruments in some 
countries might be a response to shocks experienced by different sectors. This component 
would be negative, and hence reduce aggregate volatility, for example if macro-economic 
policies are countercyclical, that is, they are aimed at neutralizing or mitigating the effect of 
economic cycles. In the context of GCC countries, this would entail reducing government 
spending or tightening credit during downturns or periods of relatively low demand for oil 
and gas. As we show in the paper, in most GCC countries this component is instead positive 
                                                 
1 For theories linking risk, diversification and development, see Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990), Kraay and Ventura (2007), Obstfeld (1994) and Saint-Paul (1992). For theories of sectoral 
transformation, see Caselli and Coleman (2000) and the references therein. 
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and large, contributing to aggregate volatility. We argue that this is largely due to the lack of 
actively countercyclical monetary policy (due to the choice of a fixed exchange-rate regime) 
and a generally pro-cyclical government spending pattern.  
We put the results into context by comparing the countries’ patterns of volatility with 
those observed in other countries at the same level of development, as well as with those 
observed in other resource-rich economies.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of growth rates, 
volatility and the shares of different sectors in the six GCC economies from 1970 to 2006. 
Section 3 studies the sources of economic volatility and compares the performance of GCC 
countries vis-à-vis countries at the same level of development or rich in natural resources. 
Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
2. ECONOMIC GROWTH, VOLATILITY AND DIVERSIFICATION 
The economic performance of GCC countries has been anything but uniform, as is illustrated 
in Figure 1.2 The figure depicts the average yearly growth rate of per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP – blue bars) and the level of volatility, measured as the standard deviation of 
annual growth rates (red bars), by decade, from 1970 to 2006, for all GCC countries.3 
Measured as such, volatility captures deviations, both up and down, from the average growth 
rate of the decade. These deviations are what we refer to as ‘shocks’. The 1970s witnessed 
large growth rates in the United Arab Emirates (12 per cent), Saudi Arabia (5.7 per cent), 
Oman (5.5 per cent), and Bahrain (3 per cent), together with negative growth rates in Kuwait 
and Qatar. The common denominator for the period was the extremely high volatility faced 
by all six countries. The 1980s opened a grim chapter of negative growth rates for all 
countries (except Oman), with losses ranging from 3.6 per cent per year in Kuwait to 6.5 per 
cent per year in Saudi Arabia, and continually high levels of volatility. 
In the 1990s, despite the difficult start, most countries posted net gains, with the 
exception of the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait, in particular, experienced an average growth 
rate over the decade of 4.4 per cent, after two decades of negative growth. Volatility during 
the decade was still high in all countries, with Kuwait’s being dramatically high by any
                                                 
2 All subplots share the same scale, except for Kuwait’s, since the high volatility of the 1990s, caused mainly by 
the war, is exceedingly large. 
3 The raw data come from the UN statistical database from 1970 to 2006. 
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Figure 1. Average yearly growth rates and volatility, by country, 1970–2006. 
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metric. The early 2000s paint a totally different picture: positive growth in all countries, 
together with unprecedented stability. 
The lower volatility of the later period does not seem simply to be the result  
of positive contagion from the so called ‘Great Moderation’, or the long period of low 
volatility enjoyed by most developed countries before the onset of the current financial  
crisis. More fundamental changes seem to have taken place in GCC countries, as illustrated  
in Figure 2. This figure shows the shares of different sectors in total GDP from 1970 to 2006 
for all six GCC countries.  
As Figure 2 shows, the most prominent sector in all subplots is mining and utilities 
(squares), reflecting the preponderance of oil in GCC economies.4 The prevalence of oil, 
however, has been decreasing. Most notably, the United Arab Emirates have seen a steady 
decline in mining as a share of GDP, from above 70 per cent in the 1970s to around 30 per 
cent in the 2000s, despite the sharp increase in oil prices in recent years. ‘Other activities’, 
comprising financial intermediation, real estate, public administration, education, health and 
other services, have gained ground during this period to reach above 20 per cent of the 
Emirates’ GDP by the end of the period. Other GCC countries have undergone a similar, 
though less steep, structural transformation. The earliest diversifier is Bahrain, where services 
grouped under ‘other activities’ had already reached roughly 50 per cent of the economy in 
the 1980s. Manufacturing, which was virtually non-existent at the beginning of the 1970s has 
also increased significantly as a share of GDP in all countries, accounting for about 10 per 
cent or more of GCC economies.  
In spite of the progress over the past decades, however, GCC economies  
continue to be highly volatile. In the next section we study the sources of volatility and,  
in particular, we measure the extent to which sectoral concentration accounts for the  
observed outcome volatility.
                                                 
4 Mining and quarrying refer mostly to oil, while utilities include electricity, gas and water supply. 
Unfortunately, the source (United Nations Statistics) does not disaggregate the data further. 
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Figure 2. Sectoral shares of GDP, by country, 1970–2006. 
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3. SOURCES OF VOLATILITY AND THE ROLE OF SECTORAL DIVERSIFICATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
3.1. Volatility components 
In this section we study the sources of economic volatility in GCC countries. Following 
Koren and Tenreyro (2007), the analysis identifies three main components of the volatility of 
aggregate GDP growth.5 The first component relates to the volatility of sectoral shocks: an 
economy that specializes in sectors that exhibit high intrinsic volatility will tend to 
experience higher aggregate volatility. Two different elements play a role: one is the degree 
of sectoral concentration (how concentrated or diversified the economy is in terms of the 
number and relative sizes of the sectors) and the other is the volatility of the different sectors. 
In GCC economies, traditionally, the two elements have played in the same direction: the 
economies have been highly concentrated in one, very volatile, sector. 
The second component relates to aggregate country-specific shocks that are common 
to all sectors in the economy. This component aims at capturing volatility due to 
macroeconomic policy or political instability. In our study it will also capture the volatility 
induced by the war. It may also capture other aggregate shocks, such as technological 
developments that affect all sectors in the economy.  
The third component of volatility relates to the covariance between country-specific 
and sector-specific shock. Concretely, any change in fiscal or monetary policy in some 
countries might be a deliberate response to shocks experienced by particular sectors. This 
component will be negative, for example, if macro-economic policies are countercyclical, 
that is, they are aimed at mitigating or neutralizing the effect of economic cycles; in the 
context of GCC economies, a countercyclical policy would imply reducing government 
spending or tightening credit during periods of relatively weak demand for oil. We show  
later that this component tends to be positive in most countries, largely reflecting the lack  
of actively countercyclical policies. 
This breakdown of volatility is important because it allows us to asses the extent  
to which volatility in GCC countries is due to high exposure to the oil sector as opposed  
to country-specific shocks which are more likely to be caused by domestic macroeconomic 
                                                 
5 For alternative or complementary empirical studies see Forni and Reichlin (1996); Brooks and del Negro 
(2004); del Negro (2003); Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003); Imbs and Wacziarg (2003); Imbs (2007); 
Lehmann and Modest (1985); Ramey and Ramey (1995); Stockman (1988). 
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policy; in other words, aggregate volatility might result from possibly inadequate  
domestic policies. 
Formally, as in Koren and Tenreyro (2007), the variance of GDP growth, Var(y),  
can be decomposed as follows (see technical appendix):  
Var(y)=Sectoral Variance + Country Variance + Sector-Country Covariance, 
where the sectoral-variance component can be further decomposed into the variance due to 
global shocks, that is, shocks that affect all countries in the world in the same fashion, and the 
variance due to idiosyncratic (or country-specific) sectoral shocks, which affect different 
countries in different ways.  
Sectoral Variance=Global Sectoral Variance + Idiosyncratic Sectoral Variance. 
In the case of GCC countries, we expect both the idiosyncratic sectoral variance (mostly 
generated by the oil sector) and the country-specific variance (mostly due to policy  
and political instability, including the war) to account for a large part of the volatility  
of the economies. 
The method used for the volatility decomposition can be summarized in words as 
follows. We first compute for each country (c), sector (s) and year (t), a measure of ‘shock’, 
denoted ycst. This is calculated as the deviation from the average growth rate of the growth 
rate of a given sector in a given country over the period. We measure sector-specific shocks 
(λst) as the average of ycst over all countries for a given sector.6 Put differently, a sector-
specific shock is the average shock affecting a given sector in all countries. Country-specific 
shocks are then identified as the average shock in a given country after subtracting the sector- 
specific shock.7 In other words, a country-specific shock is the average shock affecting all 
sectors in a given country. The residual is the country and sector specific shock, εjs.8 Once  
the three different shocks (λst, μjt, εjst) are identified, we compute variances and covariances  
as detailed in Appendix 2. 
To carry out the sectoral decomposition, we use data on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars 
from the UN statistical database from 1970 to 2006. The countries in the analysis are listed in 
Appendix 1. Before proceeding, it should be acknowledged that one limitation in studying the 
productive structure of GCC economies is the paucity of organized information on the  
                                                 
6 In formula, this is λst=(1/C)∑Ci=1 ycst, where C denotes the number of countries 
7 In formula, this is μjt=(1/S)∑Si=1 ycst-λst, where S is the number of sectors. 
8 In formula εjst= ycst,- λst - μjt. 
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Figure 3. Sources of volatility in Bahrain, by decade. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sources of volatility in Kuwait, by decade. 
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subject, especially for the early period. The UN database is the only source available with 
comparable data across GCC countries. We are hence unavoidably exposed to inaccuracies 
due to measurement error by the source. 
The estimation procedure yields a decomposition of volatility into different sources 
for each country and year. Figures 3 to 8 plot the decomposition for the six GCC countries  
in 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005. 
Figure 3 shows the volatility decomposition for Bahrain, which is surprisingly  
stable over the thirty-year period we analyse. The most important source of volatility  
is the aggregate country-specific variance, the component that is common to all sectors  
in the economy. This accounts for more than 60 per cent of overall volatility. The second 
biggest component is the idiosyncratic sectoral variance, which accounts for almost 30 per 
cent of volatility. The covariance term and the global sectoral variance component account 
for the remaining 10 per cent.  
Figure 4 shows the volatility decomposition in Kuwait. As the plot shows, in the 
1970s the idiosyncratic sectoral variance – mostly dominated by shocks to the oil sector – 
was the biggest source of volatility, accounting for more than 50 per cent of overall volatility. 
Country-specific volatility in the decade accounted for about 45 per cent of aggregate 
volatility, while the other two components were jointly below 5 per cent. The picture changes 
in the 1980s and particularly the 1990s, when the idiosyncratic sectoral variance becomes less 
important, accounting for about 35 and 30 per cent of overall volatility, respectively, in the 
1980s and 1990s. Country-specific volatility became the dominant source of volatility, 
reaching 70 per cent in the 1990s. 
This pattern only slightly reverted in the 2000s, with the idiosyncratic-sectoral-
volatility component accounting for 40 per cent and the country-volatility component 
accounting for 57 per cent of overall volatility. As the picture shows, global shocks play a 
relatively small role in the Kuwaiti economy. 
The volatility decomposition for Oman, depicted in Figure 5, shows a similar pattern. 
In the 1970s the idiosyncratic component accounted for about 45 per cent of the variance, 
while the country-specific component accounted for about 57 per cent. The role of 
idiosyncratic sectoral shocks decreased over the 1980s and 1990s, reaching just a third of the 
overall volatility in the 1990s. The 2000s saw a reversal, with the idiosyncratic component 
climbing back to 42 per cent of the variance. The time-series evolution of the country- 
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Figure 5. Sources of volatility in Oman, by decade. 
 
 
Figure 6. Sources of volatility in Qatar, by decade. 
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Figure 7. Sources of volatility in Saudi Arabia, by decade. 
 
 
Figure 8. Sources of volatility in United Arab Emirates, by decade. 
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specific component is the mirror image of the idiosyncratic component, increasing over  
the 1980s and 1990s and decreasing in the 2000s. The covariance of sectoral and aggregate 
shocks was actually negative in Oman (the only GCC country for which this was the case), 
contributing to lower volatility (not shown in the pie chart); its magnitude, however,  
was relatively small. Finally, the global volatility component played virtually no  
role in the economy. 
Qatar’s volatility decomposition is portrayed in Figure 6. As was the case in Kuwait 
and Oman, the idiosyncratic component in Qatar was high in the 1970s, reaching 55 per cent 
of overall volatility. It fell to 35 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s and then increased again  
in the 2000s to about half of the overall volatility. The opposite trend is followed by the 
country-specific component. Unlike in the other economies, the covariance between 
macroeconomic and sector-specific shocks accounts for a non-negligible share of the overall 
volatility, in the order of 10 per cent throughout most of the period, suggesting that more 
could be done in terms of enacting countercyclical fiscal or monetary policies in the 
economy. Finally, global sectoral shocks account for roughly 3 per cent of volatility,  
with no significant changes over time. 
The pattern of decrease in idiosyncratic sectoral volatility from the 1970s to the 1980s 
and 1990s and the reversal in the 2000s is intensified in Saudi Arabia. The idiosyncratic 
component accounted for 72 per cent of overall volatility in the 1970s, for 35 and 45  
per cent in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, and for 63 per cent in the 2000s. Country 
volatility, in turn, moved from 20 per cent in the 1970s to peak at 50 per cent in the 1990s 
and fall to 29 per cent in the 2000s. The covariance between aggregate and sectoral shocks 
was high in the 1980s and 1990s, at just below 10 per cent of overall volatility, and smaller  
in the 1970s and 2000s. 
The volatility decomposition for the United Arab Emirates is shown in Figure 8. 
Differently from the other GCC economies, the idiosyncratic component fell steadily over 
time in the Emirates, going from 45 per cent in the 1970s to about 20 per cent in the 2000s. 
The country-specific component increased accordingly, from 50 per cent to 70 per cent 
during the period. The covariance term as well as the global-sectoral-volatility component 
accounted for a small share of overall volatility during the period. 
The general message from these pictures is that the idiosyncratic component of 
volatility, which is to a large extent unavoidable in a resource-rich economy, is of the same 
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order of magnitude as the country-specific component, which is to a large extent a reflection 
of aggregate domestic policy. Equally important, the covariance between aggregate shocks 
and sectoral shocks is positive in most countries. This suggests that there is scope for 
improvement in terms of domestic policies. Specifically, more aggressively countercyclical 
monetary and fiscal policy should help attenuate the fluctuations in output caused by the 
inherently volatile nature of the oil sector. With regard to monetary policy, however, most 
GCC countries have maintained a fairly passive stance. In particular, most currencies of GCC 
countries have been formally pegged to the SDR (special drawing right), except for the 
Omani rial, which has been pegged to the dollar since the 1970s, and the Kuwaiti dinar, 
which has been pegged to an undisclosed basket of currencies. De facto, however, most 
countries have been pegged to the US dollar for the last three decades, with the peg becoming 
official in the early 2000s. Pegging the exchange rate under free movement of capital implies 
that GCC countries have relinquished monetary policy autonomy, and the scope for actively 
counteracting shocks is hence limited. (Only Kuwait and Oman have used direct instruments 
– ceilings on certain types of credit – in order to use monetary policy more actively.) 
With regard to fiscal spending, GCC countries have failed to undertake 
countercyclical policies (Fasano and Wang 2002), although the extent of pro-cyclicality in 
spending is hard to gauge, partly because of the lack of clear and comparable fiscal concepts, 
methods and data across GCC countries. Fasano and Wang (2002) argue that most GCC 
countries have followed highly procyclical spending policies (that is, increasing government 
spending in times of oil booms and decreasing it in downturns). 
3.2. Volatility patterns in perspective: comparative analysis of volatility patterns  
vis-à-vis other countries 
In this section we study the evolution of the different components of volatility over time  
for the six GCC countries. We compare their performance with that of countries at the  
same level of development, measured by the level of GDP per capita in the year analysed.  
We also compare their performance with countries that are also rich in oil, which we call  
our control group.  
To build the control group we sorted countries by the share of petroleum, petroleum 
products and gas in their exports in 2000. We selected the top twenty-five countries. Of these 
twenty-five we selected a control group according to the following two criteria: (i) the 
country is not in the Persian Gulf region; and (ii) it exports oil or gas worth a total of more 
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than $4 billion. This resulted in the following countries being chosen: Algeria, Canada, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Netherlands and Norway. 
In what follows, we graphically show the performance of each component of 
volatility in 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005, plotted against the level of real GDP per capita in the 
corresponding country and year. Data on real GDP, adjusted by purchasing power parity 
(PPP), come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.9 We highlight in the 
plots both the ‘treatment group’, that is, the group of six GCC countries, and the ‘control 
group’, listed above. For ease of comparison, we also plot in a separate graph only the control 
and treatment groups. The list of countries and the conventional alphabetic code 
abbreviations are displayed in Appendix A. 
3.2.1. Sectoral volatility 
 
Figure 9. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and development, 1975, 
all countries. 
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9 Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). Data for Bahrain in 1975 and for Oman in 2005 are not available from this 
source. 
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Figure 10. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and development, 
1975, GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
Canada
Colombia
Algeria
Indonesia
Nigeria
NetherlandsNorway
United Arab EmiratesKuwait
Oman
QatarSaudi Arabia
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
6 7 8 9 10 11
lreal
Control group Treatment group
 
 
Figure 11. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and development, 
1985, all countries. 
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Figure 12. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and development, 
1985, GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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Figure 9 shows the plot of the (natural logarithm of) the Sectoral Volatility Component (the 
aggregate of both global and idiosyncratic volatility) against the (log of ) level of 
development in 1975. The fitted line is the result of a linear regression.10  
As the plot shows, sectoral volatility tends to fall quite markedly with the level of 
development. Strikingly, all six GCC countries stand out as the biggest outliers in the plot, 
meaning that their levels of sectoral volatility are significantly above those in countries at 
similar levels of development. 
Interestingly, as is made clearer in Figure 10, they also stand out in 1975 when 
compared with other resource-rich countries. The latter systematically fall on or below the 
predicted regression line for the whole sample, showing that natural resource endowments do 
not necessarily imply high volatility.11 
Figure 11 shows the relation between the (log of) Sectoral Volatility and the (log of) 
level of development in 1985. As before, the relationship is strongly negative, and hence we 
                                                 
10 We aggregate both sources of sectoral risk for ease of exposition. 
11 Note that the prediction line in these and the following graphs, are obtained from a regression that uses the 
whole sample. So, for example, the regression line in Figure 10 is the same as that displayed in Figure 9. 
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should expect relatively richer countries to display lower levels of sectoral volatility. GCC 
countries are, as before, remarkable outliers in the regression. Compared with the levels  
a decade earlier, however, some progress can already be appreciated: while still outliers,  
the GCC countries are relatively closer to the prediction line, with Saudi Arabia  
particularly close to it. 
Figure 12 more clearly shows where resource-rich countries stand in the sectoral-
volatility-development line. GCC countries are overwhelmingly more volatile than other 
resource-rich economies outside the Persian Gulf, with Kuwait and the United Arab  
Emirates at the high end of the group.  
Figures 13 and 15 show the relation between (logged) sectoral volatility and (logged) 
GDP per capita in 1995 and 2005, respectively. The overall relation continues to be 
significantly negative. The most salient change from previous decades is the decline in 
 
Figure 13. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and development, 
1995, all countries. 
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Figure 14. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and development, 1995, 
GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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Figure 15. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and 
development, 2005, all countries. 
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Figure 16. Sectoral volatility (global and idiosyncratic) component and 
development, 2005, GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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sectoral volatility of GCC countries. While still above the prediction line, the countries 
appear to be much closer to other countries at the same level of development.12  
In comparison with other resource-rich countries, significant progress can be 
appreciated as well, as two of the seven control-group countries are now above the fitted line. 
While still above the levels typical of other countries rich in natural resources, the 
convergence is evident. 
3.2.2. Covariance of sector-specific and country-specific shocks 
Figure 17 shows the covariance of sector-specific and country-specific shocks in 1975 for  
all countries, plotted against the (log of) real GDP per capita in that year. The scatter plot, 
together with the regression line, shows that there is no systematic relation between the two. 
All GCC countries, however, with the exception of Oman, appear to have above-average 
covariance. This suggests, as argued earlier, that there is no systematic countercyclical 
response of policies to shocks. More concretely, monetary and fiscal policies have failed at 
being sufficiently countercyclical (that is, they have not been expansionary in recessionary 
 
                                                 
12 Oman is not displayed in the 2005 figures, since data on real GDP per capita  is not available from WDI for 
that year. 
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Figure 17. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 1975, 
all countries. 
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Figure 18. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 
1975, GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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times – or in times when oil prices are low); this lack of countercyclicality can explain why 
most countries feature negative values for the covariance.  
When compared with other resource-rich economies, as depicted in Figure 18,  
GCC countries also perform rather poorly, again with the exception of Oman, which  
shows a negative covariance. 
The picture proves resilient to the passage of time. In 1985, there is a change in 
rankings, with the United Arab Emirates becoming the country with the highest covariance in 
the group and in the world. This is shown in Figures 19 and 20, which show the plots of the 
covariance against the (logged) level of development in 1985, for the whole sample and the 
sample of resource-rich countries respectively. 
Oman is systematically the country with the lowest (most negative) covariance  
among the resource-rich group. 
Figures 21 to 24 show the covariance component of volatility in 1995 and 2005, 
plotted as before against the level of development, correspondingly for all countries in the 
sample and for the control and treatment groups only. 
The conclusion from these pictures is that no significant progress has been made in 
terms of lowering the level of the covariance over time, whether in absolute terms or relative 
to other countries at the same level of development or endowed with natural resources.  
As argued before, this is perhaps one of the determinants of volatility  
that policymakers could more effectively influence, through more aggressive 
counterbalancing policies. 
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Figure 19. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 1985, all 
countries. 
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Figure 20. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 1985, GCC 
countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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Figure 21. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 1995, 
all countries. 
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Figure 22. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 1995, 
GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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Figure 23. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 2005, 
all countries. 
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Figure 24. Covariance of sectoral and country-specific volatility and development, 2005, 
GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
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3.2.3. Country-specific volatility 
The last component of volatility – country-specific volatility – is studied in Figures 25 and 
26. (As explained in the technical appendix, by construction the country-specific volatility 
component is invariant over time.) Figure 25 shows the (log of) country-specific volatility 
against the (logged) real GDP per capita in 1995. (The picture does not change substantially 
when volatility is plotted against GDP per capita in other years.) 
As before, the line shows the fitted values from a regression of (log) country volatility 
on real GDP per capita. The relation is significantly negative, that is, countries at lower level 
of development tend to experience higher country-specific volatility. 
Figures 25 and 26 both show that GCC countries tend to be outliers when compared 
with the reference groups, showing higher country volatility than countries at the same level 
of development or countries that are also rich in natural resources. 
 
 
Figure 25. Country-specific volatility component (1970–2006) and development (1995), all 
countries. 
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Figure 26. Country-specific volatility component (1970–2006) and development (1995), 
GCC countries and ‘treatment’ countries. 
Canada
Colombia
Algeria
IndonesiaNigeria
Netherlands
Norway
United Arab Emirates
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
6 7 8 9 10 11
lreal
Control group Treatment group
 
 
Saudi Arabia is the best performer, being just above the level predicted for countries 
at the same level of development. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait show the highest 
level of country volatility. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In part due to their strong dependence on oil, GCC economies are intrinsically more volatile 
than other economies at the same level of development. Startling progress has been achieved, 
however, since the 1970s, volatility falling in most GCC countries by a factor of 4 or more by 
2005. The fall in volatility is mostly due to two factors. The first is the rise of the service 
economy (comprising, among others, financial intermediation, tourism and real estate), which 
is inherently less volatile than the oil sector and has led to higher levels of sectoral 
diversification. The second is the general decline in volatility in world markets since the 
1980s, a period that economists have called the ‘Great Moderation’. The current Great Credit 
Crisis, however, has interrupted this trend. 
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Our comparative analysis of the sources of volatility suggests that, despite the 
progress achieved, there is still scope for improvement. First, other resource-rich economies 
facing the same challenges (and shocks) as GCC countries tend systematically to display 
lower levels of volatility.  
Second, and perhaps more relevant, the high levels of country-specific volatility and 
the positive covariance between sectoral shocks and country-specific shocks suggest that 
macroeconomic policy could be improved to mitigate volatility further. Concretely, it seems 
that more aggressively countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies could be put in place in 
GCC economies to lower the macroeconomic impact of oil shocks. With regard to monetary 
policy, most GCC countries have maintained a fairly passive stance. In particular, most 
currencies of GCC countries have been de facto pegged to the US dollar for the last three 
decades, with the peg becoming official in the early 2000s. Pegging the exchange rate in a 
context of free movement of capital implies that GCC countries have relinquished monetary 
policy autonomy. The scope for actively counteracting shocks through credit policy is hence 
limited. (Only Kuwait and Oman have used direct instruments – ceilings on certain types of 
credit – in order to use monetary policy more actively.) 
With regard to fiscal spending, GCC countries have failed to undertake 
countercyclical policies (e.g. cutting government spending during booms and increasing 
spending in downturns); on the contrary, fiscal policy in most GCC countries has been highly 
pro-cyclical (Fasano and Wang 2002), contributing to higher volatility. 
In sum, the overall balance for GCC countries over the past four decades is positive: 
significant progress has been made in terms of increasing stability in the region. There is, 
however, scope for further gains, as the experience from other resource-rich economies 
shows. More countercyclical policies appear to be a promising route. Last, but not least, the 
current global financial crisis has also underscored financial-sector vulnerabilities that need 
to be addressed (in this GCC countries are by no means unique). Diversification alone is not 
enough, as it does not shield countries from aggregate shocks; Dubai is perhaps the best case 
in point. Its efforts to diversify and develop other sectors (real estate, tourism, finance) have 
led to significant improvements in performance and living standards, along with lower 
dependence on oil. But it opened the door to other sources of shocks (e.g. financial and real-
estate bubbles) that led to sharp disruptions in the economy when the global credit crunch 
caused substantial falls in real estate and stock markets. We leave for future work the new 
challenges underscored by the global crisis. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF COUNTRIES AND CODES
Afghanistan   AFG 
Albania   ALB 
Algeria   DZA 
Andorra   AND 
Angola   AGO 
Antigua and Barbuda  ATG 
Argentina   ARG 
Armenia   ARM 
Aruba    ABW 
Australia   AUS 
Austria   AUT 
Azerbaijan   AZE 
Bahamas   BHS 
Bahrain   BHR 
Bangladesh   BGD 
Barbados   BRB 
Belarus   BLR 
Belgium   BEL 
Belize    BLZ 
Benin    BEN 
Bermuda   BMU 
Bhutan    BTN 
Bolivia   BOL 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 
Botswana   BWA 
Brazil    BRA 
Brunei Darussalam  BRN 
Bulgaria   BGR 
Burkina Faso   BFA 
Burundi   BDI 
Cambodia   KHM 
Cameroon   CMR 
Canada   CAN 
Cape Verde   CPV 
Cayman Islands  CYM 
Central African Republic CAF 
Chad    TCD 
Chile    CHL 
China    CHN 
Colombia   COL 
Comoros   COM 
Congo, Democratic Republic  COG 
Congo    COD 
Costa Rica   CRI 
Cote d’Ivoire   CIV 
Cuba    CUB 
Cyprus    CYP 
Czech Republic  CZE 
Denmark   DNK 
Djibouti   DJI 
Dominica   DMA 
Dominican Republic  DOM 
Ecuador   ECU 
Egypt    EGY 
El Salvador   SLV 
Equatorial Guinea  GNQ 
Eritrea    ERI 
Estonia   EST 
Ethiopia   ETH 
Fiji    FJI 
Finland   FIN 
France    FRA 
French Polynesia  YF 
Gabon    GAB 
Gambia   GMB 
Georgia   GEO 
Germany   DEU 
Ghana    GHA 
Greece    GRC 
Greenland   GRL 
Grenada   GRD 
Guatemala   GTM 
Guinea    GIN 
Guinea-Bissau   GNB 
Guyana   GUY 
Haiti    HTI 
Honduras   HND 
Hong Kong SAR of China HKG 
Hungary   HUN 
Iceland   ISL 
India    IND 
Indonesia   IDN 
Iran, Islamic Republic of IRN 
Iraq    IRQ 
Ireland    IRL 
Israel    ISR 
Italy    ITA 
Jamaica   JAM 
Japan    JPN 
Jordan    JOR 
Kazakhstan   KAZ 
Kenya    KEN 
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Kiribati   KIR 
Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. PRK 
Korea, Republic of  KOR 
Kuwait   KWT 
Kyrgyzstan   KGZ 
Laos    LAO 
Latvia    LVA 
Lebanon   LBN 
Lesotho   LSO 
Liberia    LBR 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya LBY 
Liechtenstein   LIE 
Lithuania   LTU 
Luxembourg   LUX 
Macao SAR of China  MAC 
Macedonia, TFYR of  MKD 
Madagascar   MDG 
Malawi   MWI 
Malaysia   MYS 
Maldives   MDV 
Mali    MLI 
Malta    MLT 
Marshall Islands  MHL 
Mauritania   MRT 
Mauritius   MUS 
Mexico   MEX 
Micronesia, Fed. States FSM 
Moldova, Republic of  MDA 
Monaco   MCO 
Mongolia   MNG 
Montenegro   MNE 
Morocco   MAR 
Mozambique   MOZ 
Myanmar   MMR 
Namibia   NAM 
Nepal    NPL 
Netherlands Antilles  ANT 
Netherlands   NLD 
New Caledonia  NCL 
New Zealand   NZL 
Nicaragua   NIC 
Niger    NER 
Nigeria   NGA 
Norway   NOR 
Oman    OMN 
Pakistan   PAK 
Palau    PLW 
Panama   PAN 
Papua New Guinea  PNG 
Paraguay   PRY 
Peru    PER 
Philippines   PHL 
Poland    POL 
Portugal   PRT 
Puerto Rico   PRI 
Qatar    QAT 
Romania   ROU 
Russian Federation  RUS 
Rwanda   RWA 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  KNA 
Saint Lucia   LCA 
Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines  VCT 
Samoa    WSM 
San Marino   SMR 
São Tomé and Príncipe STP 
Saudi Arabia   SAU 
Senegal   SEN 
Serbia    SRB 
Seychelles   SYC 
Sierra Leone   SLE 
Singapore   SGP 
Slovakia   SVK 
Slovenia   SVN 
Solomon Islands  SLB 
Somalia   SOM 
South Africa   ZAF 
Spain    ESP 
Sri Lanka   LKA 
Sudan    SDN 
Suriname   SUR 
Swaziland   SWZ 
Sweden   SWE 
Switzerland   CHE 
Syrian Arab Republic  SYR 
Tajikistan   TJK 
Thailand   THA 
Timor-Leste   TLS 
Togo    TGO 
Tonga    TON 
Trinidad and Tobago  TTO 
Tunisia   TUN 
Turkey    TUR 
Turkmenistan   TKM 
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Uganda   UGA 
Ukraine   UKR 
United Arab Emirates  ARE 
United Kingdom  GBR 
United Republic of 
Tanzania: Mainland TZA 
United States   USA 
Uruguay   URY 
Uzbekistan   UZB 
Vanuatu   VUT 
Venezuela   VEN 
Vietnam   VNM 
Yemen    YEM 
Zambia   ZMB 
Zimbabwe   ZWE 
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APPENDIX 2: TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT 
Two main ideas underlie the discussion of the determinants of the volatility of GDP growth. 
The first emphasizes the role of the sectoral composition of the economy as the main 
determinant of volatility: a high degree of specialization or specialization in high-volatility 
sectors translates into high aggregate volatility. The second idea points to domestic 
macroeconomic volatility, possibly related to policy mismanagement or political instability, 
among other country-specific factors. 
The emphasis on sectoral composition motivates us first to break down the value 
added of a country into the sum of the value added of different sectors, each of which has a 
potentially different level of intrinsic volatility. Innovations in the growth rate of GDP in 
country j (j=1,...,J), denoted by qj, can then be expressed, as the weighted sum of the 
innovations in the growth rates of value-added in every sector, yjs, with s=1,...,S: 
qj =Σ αjs yjs, 
where the weights, αjs, denote the share of output in sector s of country j. The object of our 
study is the variance of qj, Var(qj), and its components. 
To separate the role of domestic aggregate volatility13 from that of the sectoral 
composition of the economy, we can further breakdown innovations to a sector’s growth rate, 
yjs, into three disturbances: 
yjs =λs+μj+εjs.     (1) 
The first disturbance (λs) is specific to a sector but common to all countries. This includes, for 
example, a shock to the price of a major input in production, such as steel, which may affect 
the productivity of sectors that are steel-intensive. More generally, technology and price 
shocks that affect a sector or group of sectors across countries in the same way will fall in this 
category. 
The second disturbance (μj) is specific to a country but common to all sectors within a 
country. So, for example, a monetary tightening in country j might cause deterioration in the 
productivity of all sectors in country j, because all need some amount of liquidity to produce. 
The third disturbance (εjs) captures the shocks that are specific to a sector and country. 
In the previous example, if some sectors are more sensitive to the liquidity squeeze and have 
a steeper fall in productivity, the difference with respect to the average will be reflected in εjs. 
                                                 
13 The terms ‘risk’ and ‘volatility’ are used interchangeably. 
35 
Similarly, if some global shocks have a different impact on sectoral productivity in 
different countries, the differential impact will be captured by εjs. Finally, any disturbance 
specific to both a country and sector will be reflected in εjs. Oil shocks, which affect countries 
in different ways, depending on whether they are net exporters or importers, will tend to fall 
into this category. This is why, as the analysis will show, this term will be particularly high in 
GCC economies. 
Of course, all three disturbances can potentially be correlated with each other. For 
example, λs and μj will tend to be correlated if in some countries macroeconomic policies are 
more responsive to global sectoral shocks, or, alternatively, if a country is highly influential 
in a particular sector, in which case an aggregate shock in that country may affect that sector 
in other countries. Moreover, as pointed out above, certain sectors may be more responsive to 
country-specific shocks (implying that εjs and μj could be correlated), or sectoral productivity 
in certain countries may be affected differently by global sectoral shocks (implying that εjs 
and λs could be correlated). 
Expression (1) provides a convenient way of partitioning the data. Written as such, it 
is simply an accounting identity, since εjs picks up everything not accounted for by the sector- 
or country-specific shocks, and since we do not place any restriction on the way in which the 
three disturbances covary. In what follows, we explain how to decompose the variance of qj 
into the corresponding variances and covariances of these different disturbances. It is 
convenient to rewrite innovations to growth of GDP in matrix notation. Denoting by yj the 
vector of sectoral innovations yjs and by aj the vector of sectoral shares αjs, our object of 
interest, Var(qj), can be written as: 
Var(qj)= a’j E(yj y’j) aj    (2) 
Thus in order to decompose Var(qjs) we need to decompose the variance-covariance matrix of 
the innovations to sectoral growth rates, E(yj y’j). Simple matrix algebra shows that the 
variance-covariance matrix of country j’s sectoral shocks can be written as 
E(yj y’j)=Ωλ+Ωεj+ωμj²11′+( Ωλμj 1′+1 Ωλμj)+Γj, 
where 
Ωλ = E(λλ′), 
Ωεj = diag(σj1²...σjS²), 
ωμj² = E(μj²), 
Ωλμj =E(λμj), 
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where 1 denotes the S×1 vector of ones, and λ and μ denote the vectors of sectoral shocks (λs) 
and country shocks (μj), respectively. The matrix Ωλ is the variance-covariance of sector-
specific global shocks; Ωεj is the matrix collecting the variances of the sector- and country-
specific residuals εεj, σjs²=E(εεj ²); ωμj² is the variance of country-specific shocks; Ωλμj is the 
covariance between country-specific and global sectoral shocks; and finally, the matrix Γj 
collects the remaining components of E(yj y’j), that is, the covariances between the residuals 
and the sectoral and country-specific shocks, and the covariance among residuals. 
It turns out that the term Γj plays a quantitatively negligible role in accounting for 
aggregate volatility. In anticipation of that result, the exposition that follows ignores this last 
component. More specifically, we shall maintain the working hypothesis that the residual 
shocks are idiosyncratic (uncorrelated with each other and with the sector- and country-
specific shocks), and hence Γj is null. This implies that we can write the variance-covariance 
matrix as: 
  E(yj y’j)=Ωλ+Ωεj+ωμj²11′+( Ωλμj 1′+1 Ωλμj)    (3) 
Plugging (3) into (2), aggregate volatility can be written as: 
Var(qj)= a’j E(yj y’j) aj= a’j Ωλaj + a’j Ωεjaj +ωμj²+2 a’j Ωλμj.  (4) 
This formulation clearly shows that production in country j is more volatile:  
1. If the country specializes in volatile sectors – that is, sectors exposed to large and 
frequent shocks. This is reflected in the first two terms: 
a. The first, a’j Ωλaj, relates to global sectoral shocks. This term is large when 
sectors exposed to big and frequent global shocks account for a large share of the 
country’s GDP. 
b. The second term, a’j Ωεjaj, relates to idiosyncratic sectoral shocks. This term is 
large when sectors with high idiosyncratic volatility, σjs², account for a large share 
of GDP. 
2. If country risk (ωμj²) is big – that is, the country is more volatile if aggregate 
domestic shocks are larger and more frequent. 
3. If specialization is tilted towards sectors whose shocks are positively correlated with 
country-specific shocks (a’j Ωλμj is big). This term will tend to be small, for example, if 
policy innovations are negatively correlated with the shocks to sectors that have a large 
share in country j’s GDP. 
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Thus the aggregate volatility of the economy can be decomposed as the sum of components 
with fundamentally different meanings. 
In order to quantify the various components of volatility in equation (4), we need to 
estimate the variance-covariance matrices Ωλ, Ωεj, ωμj², and Ωλμj. Our general strategy is to 
use data across countries, sectors and time to back out estimates of the sectoral shocks, λs, 
and the country shocks, μj. We then compute the sample variances and covariances of the 
estimated shocks and treat them as estimates of the corresponding population moments. 
Innovations to growth in value-added in country j and sector s, yjst, are computed  
as the deviation of the growth rate from the average (growth rate) of country j and  
sector s over time. 
We measure global sector-specific shocks as the cross-country average of yjst in each 
of the sectors. Country-specific shocks are then identified as the within-country average of 
yjst, using only the portion not explained by sector-specific shocks. The residual is then the 
difference between yjst and the two shocks. Formally,  
λest ≡ (1/J) × ∑ yjst, 
μejt ≡(1/S) × ∑ (yjst - λest) 
εejst ≡ yjst - λest - μejt, 
where superscript ‘e’ stands for ‘predicted’. 
Note that we normalize shocks so that ∑ μejt =0 – that is, country shocks are expressed 
as relative to world shocks. 
An equivalent way to formalize this is to frame the analysis as a set of cross-sectional 
regressions of yjst on country and sector dummies. More specifically, the formulas for λest, 
μejt, and εejst given above will be the result of running a regression, for each time t, of yjst, on a 
set of sector-specific and country-specific dummies (see Koren and Tenreyro 2007.) 
Estimates of the matrices Ωλ, Ωεj, ωμj², and Ωλμj are then computed using the estimated 
shocks. In particular, Ωeλ =(1/T) × ∑ λet λet ′ is the estimated variance-covariance of global-
sectoral shocks; ωeμj²=(1/T) × ∑ μejt² is the estimated variance of country-j-specific shocks; 
Ωeλμj =(1/T) ×∑ λet μejt is the estimate of the covariance between sectoral shocks and country-j 
shocks; and σejs²= (1/T) × ∑ εejst², with s=1,..., S are the estimated variances of the sectoral 
idiosyncratic shocks. 
Given the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of factors, we use data on 
sectoral GDP shares, αjst, to compute the various measures of risk exposure:  
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GSECTjt = a’jt Ωeλajt 
ISECTjt = a’jt Ωeεjajt 
CNTj = ωeμj² 
COVjt =2 a’jt Ωeλμj 
where GSECTjt is the part of the volatility of country j at time t due to global sectoral shocks 
that are common to all countries (Global Sectoral Risk); ISECTjt is the part of volatility due 
to sectoral shocks idiosyncratic to country j (Idiosyncratic Sectoral Risk); CNTj is the part of 
volatility due to country shocks, which, by construction, does not depend on time (Country-
Specific Risk); and COVjt is the covariance of global sectoral shocks with the jth country 
shock at time t (Covariance of Sector and Country-specific Risk). Total volatility can hence 
be expressed as the sum of these four components.
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